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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) and 35-1-86 (Supp. 1996).1
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. The Facts Are Not Disputed: Petitioners Osman Home Improvement,
United Staffing, and Credit General Insurance (referred to collectively as "Osman")
have accepted the findings of fact set forth in the Commission's decision. (Attached
as Appendix A.) The Commission's findings of fact are, therefore, conclusive in this
proceeding.
2. Sole Issue On Appeal: The Commission concluded that Osman was
Arnulfo "Steven" Sosa's only employer and, therefore, liable for his workers'
compensation benefits. Osman's petition for review concedes that Osman employed
Steven Sosa, but argues that Enrique Sosa also employed Steven Sosa. (For clarity,
Amulfo Steven Sosa will be referred to as "Steven"while Enrique Sosa will be
i

At the time of Stephen Sosa's work accident and throughout the adjudication of his
claim, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act was codified as Title 35, Chapter 1. Then,
on July 1, 1997, the Act was recodified as Title 34A, Chapter 2. Apart from
renumbering, no change was made to the Act's substantive or procedural provisions as
they pertain to this proceeding.
For purposes of consistency with references contained in Petitioner's brief and in
the Commission's decision, this brief will cite to the Act as it was codified prior to July 1,
1997.
-1-

referred to as "Enrique.")
3- Standard Of Review: Whether Osman was Steven's sole employer turns
on the application of the definitions of "employer" and "employee" in the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act") to the relationships that existed between
Osman, Enrique, and Steven.
In King v. Industrial Commission. 850 P.2d 12813 1291 (UtahApp. 1993), this
Court stated:
. . . a statute directing the agency to interpret or apply specific statutory
language should be interpreted as an explicit grant of discretion. If we
find such a grant, we review under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse
of discretion. That is, we afford the agency some deference and assess
whether its action is within the bounds of reasonableness.
Section 35-1-16(1) of the Act explicitly grants discretion to the Commission:
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and
authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this or any other
title or chapter it administers and to:
(d) investigate, ascertain, and determine reasonable classifications of
persons, employments, and places of employment as necessary to carry
out the purposes of this title;

In Caporoz v. Industrial Commission, ( No. 960760-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App.
August 28, 1997), this Court agreed that §35-1-16(1) of the Act is an explicit
legislative grant of discretion to the Commission: "(T)he Industrial Commission has
-2-

been granted broad discretion to determine the facts and apply the law."
Consequently, this Court should review the Commission's determination that Osman
was Steven's sole employer under a "reasonableness" standard of review.
Osman cites BB&B Transportation v. Industrial Commission. 893 P.2d 611
(Utah App. 1995) for the proposition that the Court should review the Commission's
decision for "correctness," rather than for "reasonableness." However, BB&B was
decided prior to Caporoz and did not consider the import of §35~l-16fs explicit grant
of discretion to the Commission. In Caporoz. this Court noted some of its prior cases,
presumably including BB&B. had failed to apply the proper standard of review:
We recognize that, in reviewing the Industrial Commission's
application of the law to the facts (as opposed to interpreting the law),
this court has used the less deferential correction-of-error standard in
other cases. (Citations omitted.) In those cases, this court considered
only the specific statute at issue and did not refer to section 35-1-16.
We are therefore not bound, under principles of horizontal stare decisis,
to apply the less deferential correction-of-error standard. (Citation
omitted.) Indeed, in a workers' compensation case decided just before
the effective date of UAPA, this court recognized that under section 351-16, "the Legislature has comprehensively delegated responsibility over
a particular subject to a specialized administrative agency." (Citation
omitted.) Pursuant to the legislative grant of discretion in section 35-116, we review the determinations in this case for reasonableness.
In light of the Commission's explicit discretion under §35-1-16 to determine
the facts and apply the law, and this Court's holding in Caporoz. the Commission's
determination that Osman was Steven Sosa's sole employer should be reviewed under

the "abuse of discretion" standard established by §63-46b-l6(4)(h)(i), U.C.A, and
should be affirmed if "within the bounds of reasonableness."
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Sections §35-1-42 and §35-1-43 of the Act are applicable to this petition for
review. They are attached as Appendix B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Respondents generally agree with the statement of the case set forth in the
Petitioners brief. In summary, on My 22 1995, while employed as a roofer's
assistant, Steven fell and injured his feet and ankles. He filed a claim for workers'
compensation benefits against Osman. At Osman's request, Enrique was added to the
claim as a possible employer of Steven.
After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ concluded that, at the time of his
accident, Steven was employed by Enrique. The ALJ further concluded that Osman
was Steven's statutory employer pursuant to §35-1-42(6) of the Act . The ALJ
awarded benefits to Steven and divided liability between Osman and Enrique.
However, because Enrique was uninsured and insolvent, the ALJ ordered the
Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF") to pay Enrique's share of Steven's benefits.
(The ALJ's decision is attached as Appendix C.)
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Enrique filed a Motion for Review with the Commission in which he argued
he had not been Steven's employer. The Commission agreed with Enrique and
concluded that Osman, rather than Enrique, had been Steven's sole employer at the
time of Steven's accident. (Appendix A.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Osman has specifically accepted the Commission's findings of fact. Those
facts are set forth in the Commission's decision. (Appendix A.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Steven injured his feet and ankles while working for Osman on a roofing
project. Osman concedes Steven was its employee. Osman also appears to concede
that Enrique, Steven's uncle, was its employee. However, Osman argues that
separate and apart from its employment of Steven, Enrique was also Steven's
employer. The significance of Osman's argument is that, if accepted, it would shift
one-half the liability for Steven's workers' compensation benefits away from Osman.
Under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, the answer to the question of
whether Osman and Enrique were "joint employers" of Steven, or whether Osman
was Steven's sole employer, depends on the degrees of control Osman and Enrique
each had over Steven's work. Based on the Commission's determinations of fact,
which are
-5-

unchallenged, the Commission reasonably concluded that Osman had complete
control over Steven's work and that Osman was Steven's sole employer.
Appellate courts in Utah and Arizona have dealt with other cases involving
facts very similar to the case at hand. In those cases, the appellate courts reached the
same result that the Commission reached in this case, i.e., the courts determined the
roofing contractors to be the sole employers of the injured workers. Although Osman
argues that the Commission's decision in this case is inconsistent with the Court's
decision in BB&B v. Industrial Commission, 893 P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1995), the
facts of this case are completely different from those of BB&B. Given the factual
differences between the two cases, there is no conflict between the Commission's
decision here and the Court's decision in BB&B.
Finally, the Commission's decision is consistent with the underlying policy of
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act that the cost of work accidents be allocated to
the economic activities which produced them.
POINT ONE: BECAUSE OSMAN RETAINED COMPLETE
CONTROL OVER STEVEN'S WORK, OSMAN WAS STEVEN'S
SOLE EMPLOYER.
In its petition for review, Osman does not challenge the Commission's
determination that Osman was Steven's employer. Likewise, Osman makes no
-6-

serious challenge to the Commission's determination that Osman was also Enrique's
employer. However, Osman argues that, independent of its own status as employer
of Enrique and Steven, Enrique was also, at the same time, Steven's employer.
Section §35-1-43 of the Act defines an "employee" as "each person in the
service of any employer . . . under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written, . . . ." (Emphasis added.) An individual is "in the service" of an alleged
employer when the individual is subject to the employer's control. Bennett v.
Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). In Bennett and also in Young v.
Industrial Commission. 538 P.2d 318, the Court identified some of the factors which
indicate the existence of an employment relationship, such as 1) extent and right of
supervision; 2) method of payment; 3) provision of equipment; 4) right to terminate;
and 5) whether the individual has other clients. More recently, in Averett v. Grange.
909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of the "control" test in determining whether an individual is an employee for purposes
of the Workers' Compensation Act:
In workers' compensation cases, this court has consistently held
that whether an employer-employee relationship exists depends upon
the employer's right to control the employee. . . . "It is not the actual
exercise of control that determines whether an employer-employee
relationship exists; it is the right to control that is determinative."
(citations omitted.)
-7-

The Commission recognizes that under some circumstances, and with the
requisite right of control, an employee may have two or more employers at the same
time. Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1980). However,
such circumstances are not present in this case. Here, Osman maintained ultimate
control over Steven and was his sole employer.
The Commission's decision discusses the extent of Osman's control over the
roofing project on which Steven was injured. (See Appendix A) It was Osman's
work that was being done by Enrique and Steven. Osman paid Enrique a piece rate,
while Steven was paid an hourly wage. Osman provided the roofing materials and
maintained the contractor's license under which both Enrique and Steven worked.
He approved both Enrique and Steven's employment and had the power to fire either
of them. He also retained authority to direct the details of their work. Neither
Enrique nor Steven had other clients. Finally, Osman itself paid Steven's wages.
The foregoing elements plainly establish that Osman had control over Steven's
work. However, the Commission found no similar elements of control present in
Steven's relationship with Enrique. Under these facts, the Commission reasonably
concluded that Osman was Steven's sole employer.

-8-

POINT TWO: THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT
OSMAN WAS STEVEN'S SOLE EMPLOYER IS CONSISTENT
WITH APPELLATE DECISIONS INVOLVING SIMILAR
FACTS.
Osman argues that Enrique's supervision of Steven's work, plus the fact that
Steven's hourly wage was to be deducted from Enrique's piece rate, are sufficient to
establish an employment relationship between Steven and Enrique. However, when
confronted with similar fact situations, appellate courts in Utah and Arizona have
rejected such arguments.
In Sutton v. Industrial Commission. 344 P.2d 538 (Utah 1959) a roofing
company known as "Eager Beaver" contracted to install a roof for a third party. Eager
Beaver then engaged Curtis and Reynolds, two experienced roofers, to actually install
the roof. However, control over the roofing project remained with Eager Beaver.
Eager Beaver agreed to pay Curtis and Reynolds a piece rate of $4.50 "per square."
With Eager Beaver's knowledge, Curtis and Reynolds brought Rupp into the project
to work as an assistant at $2.00 per hour. Rupp's wage was to be deducted from
Curtis and Reynold's piece rate.
Rupp was injured on the job and claimed workers' compensation benefits from
Eager Beaver. In reviewing the Commission's decision that Eager Beaver was liable
for Rupp's benefits, the Utah Supreme Court examined the Commission's application
-9-

of the "control" test to the facts of Eager Beaver's relationship with Curtis, Reynolds
and Rupp. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's conclusion that Eager
Beaver, not Curtis and Reynolds, was Rupp's employer.
A case with even greater similarity to the case now before the Court is Special
Fund v. Industrial Commission . 836 P.2d 1029 (Ariz. App. Div.2 1992). In Special
Fund, Brad's Custom Roofing hired London to work on a roofing project at a piece
rate of $10 per "square." Brad's retained the power to hire or fire and to supervise the
details of work on the project. With Brad's knowledge, London brought his 17 year
old ward, Reeder, to the job site to work as an assistant. Reeder was injured in a fall
from the roof
As in the present case, Brad's conceded it was the employer of both London
and Reeder, but argued that an independent employment relationship also existed
between London and Reeder. The Arizona court carefully analyzed the nature of the
relationships among Brad's, London and Reeder and concluded the facts did not
show that London possessed any significant control over Reeder. Specifically, the
court held that London's routine supervision of Reeder was "not in itself sufficient
to establish an employment relationship." Special Fund, p. 1033. Likewise, the court
concluded that the fact London took Reeder to the job site and allowed Reeder to
work without completing employment forms did not establish an employment
-10-

relationship between them. The Court therefore rejected Brad's claim that London
was a joint employer of Reeder and, as such, liable for half of Reeder's workers'
compensation benefits.2
Whether an employment relationship exists depends on the facts of each case.
On facts very similar to the facts of this case, the courts in Sutton and Special Fund
concluded that roofing contractors were the sole employers of their injured assistants.
In contrast to these factually similar cases which are consistent with the
Commission's decision in this case, Osman relies on the decision in BB&B, supra.
However, the facts of BB&B are unlike the facts of this case and the decision in
BB&B has no application here.
In BB&B. Bundy owned a truck which was leased to BB&B. Phillipson was
engaged to drive the truck. Both BB&B and Bundy were employers in their own
right. They entered into a contract that specifically delineated their respective
authority over Phillipson. Under the contract and in actual practice, both BB&B and
Bundy enjoyed independent authority and control over Phillipson. The Court
therefore concluded that such mixed control was sufficient to establish both BB&B

2

In Faraghar v. Industrial Commission. 911 P.2d 534 (Ariz. App. Div.l 1995), another
Arizona court concluded that under the specific facts presented, the claimant was a joint
employee of two employers. However, the Faraghar case arises from a different employment
setting (stock brokerage) and other facts which are dissimilar to the case now before this Court.
-11-

and Bundy as Phillipson's joint employers.
The facts of this case differ from BB&B on the central issue of control. Here,
there was no agreement between Osman and Enrique which reserved to Enrique any
aspect of authority or control over Steven. To the contrary, Osman retained the full
right to hire, fire, and direct the details of Steven's work. Where BB&B and Bundy
carefully established their own spheres of independent authority over Phillipson,
Osman's complete control left little or nothing to Enrique.
In summary, even though the Commission reached a different result in this case
than the result reached in BB&B, the Commission's decision nevertheless follows the
standards set forth in BB&B. The difference in result is simply due to the difference
in the facts of the two cases.
POINT THREE: THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE ACT'S POLICY THAT COSTS OF
WORK RELATED ACCIDENTS SHOULD BE PAID FROM THE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY THAT CAUSED THE ACCIDENTS.
It is a fundamental workers' compensation principle that the cost of workrelated injuries should be charged to the economic activity which caused the injuries.
Unlike pure social-insurance plans, the American compensation
system does not place the cost on the "public" as such, but on a
particular class of consumers, and retains a relationship between the
hazardousness of particular industries and the cost of the system to that
industry and consumers of its product.

-12-

Larson, Workmens' Compensation Law. §3.20, p. 1-18.

This principle is a

foundation of Utah's workers' compensation system. As stated by the Utah Supreme
Court in Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 199 P. 152 (Utah 1921) and again
in Park Utah Consol. Mines v. Industrial Commission. 36 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah
19334), "the cost of human wreckage may be taxed against the industry which
employs it . . . , for the primary obligation rests upon the industry which employs
labor."
Applying this principle to the case at hand, the cost of Steven's work related
injuries should be bom by the roofing industry in general and by Osman in particular.
The Commission's decision will achieve that goal, since workers' compensation
insurance rates for each industry group, including roofers, are adjusted to account for
losses arising from their activities. Furthermore, workers' compensation insurance
premiums for specific employers within industry groups are further adjusted to reflect
specific employers' loss experiences. Under the Commission's decision, the cost of
Steven's work accident will be allocated to the proper industry and the proper
employer.
CONCLUSION
Osman seeks to avoid a portion of its liability for Steven's workers'
compensation benefits. The crux of this dispute is whether Osman was Steven's sole

-13-

employer, and therefore liable for all his benefits. The answer depends on the
application of definitions of "employer" and "employee" established by the Act and
interpreted in appellate decisions.
The Commission properly applied the Act's standards to the admitted facts of
this case and arrived at the reasonable conclusion that Osman was Steven's sole
employer. Accordingly, the Commission and UEF respectfully urge this Court to
affirm the Commission's order holding Osman responsible for all Steven's workers'
compensation benefits.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of November, 1997.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND

Alan Hennebold
General Counsel

Sharon J. Eblen
Attorney
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Tab A

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ARNULFO STEVEN SOSA,
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Applicant,
v.
OSMAN HOME IMPROVEMENT,
CREDIT GENERAL INSURANCE,
THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS'
FUND and ENRIQUE SOSA,

*

Case No. 95-1041
*

Defendants.

Enrique Sosa ("Enrique" hereafter) and the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF") ask The
Industrial Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Enrique
was the employer of Arnulfo Steven Sosa ("Steven") and therefore liable for a portion of Steven's
benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
At the time of his work accident, was Steven employed by Enrique or by Osman Home
Improvement ("Osman")?
FINDINGS OF FACT
On July 22,1995, while working as a roofer's assistant on a multi-unit apartment project in
Sandy, Utah, Steven fell and injured his feet and ankles. The parties agree that Steven's accident
arose out of in the course of his employment and that he is entitled to workers' compensation
benefits. However, Enrique and Osman each argue that the other was Steven's employer at the time
of the accident, and therefore liable for his benefits.
Osman, a roofing company owned by Mike Osman, agreed during 1995 to place roofs on
buildings comprising a new apartment complex in Sandy, Utah. Osman then advertised in the
newspaper for roofers to work on the project.

UD359

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
ARNULFO STEVEN SOSA
PAGE 2
Enrique, an experienced roofer, saw Osman's advertisement and inquired about the work.
He did not submit a bid for the work, but instead, he and Mike Osman simply agreed that Enrique
could work on the project and would be paid a piece rate of $14 per "square". Enrique set his own
hours and provided his own staple gun, compressor, saw, ladder and safety ropes. Osman provided
all the necessary roofing materials.
Osman did not inquire whether Enrique carried workers' compensation or liability insurance.
Although Osman was a licensed contractor and familiar with the requirement of Utah law that
contractors be licensed, Osman did not require that Enrique be licensed. In fact, Enrique has never
been licensed as a contractor.
Osman retained complete authority over the roofing project, including the power to dismiss
roofers at any time for any reason. Roofers who wished to use assistants were required to obtain
Osman's permission.
A few days after Enrique was hired by Osman, Enrique told Steven, his nephew, that he also
might be able to work on the Osman roofing project. Enrique took Steven to meet Mr. Osman and
asked if Steven could work as his assistant. Mr. Osman consented. Thereafter, Mr. Osman actually
observed Steven working on the project and voiced no objection.
According to custom in the roofing trade, assistant roofers are compensated for their work
by sharing in the piece rate earned by the experienced roofer to whom they are assigned. The
amount of such compensation is negotiated between the experienced roofer and the assistant.
Enrique and Steven agreed that Steven would be receive $10 per hour, to be paid from Enrique's
piece rate of $14 per square.
Enrique and Steven began work on the Osman roofing project on July 20, 1995. On the
morning of July 22, 1995, Steven was laying down tar paper on the roof of one building while
Enrique and another assistant were at work on the roof of a second building. Steven slipped from
the roof and suffered injuries to his feet and ankles for which he is now entitled to receive workers'
compensation benefits.
After the accident, Osman paid Steven for his work up to the time of the accident.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF TAW
The ALJ's decision in this matter concludes that Enrique was Steven's direct employer and
that Osman was Steven's statutory employer, as that term is used in the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act ("the Act"). Enrique and the UEF challenge the ALJ's determination by arguing
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that Osman, not Enrique, was Steven's direct employer. This issue is significant because the Act
places primary responsibility for workers' compensation benefits on the direct employer.
Section §35-l-43(l)(b) of the Act defines "employee" as follows:
(E)ach person in the service of any employer .. . under any contract of hire, express
or implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally
working for hire, but not including any person whose employment is casual and not
in the usual course of the trade, business or occupation of his employer.
The first element in the foregoing definition of employee requires that the individual be "in
the service of an employer. Utah's Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the phrase "in the
service of in Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). There, the Court held
that "in the service of equates to the right of control. In Bennett and in Young v. Industrial
Commission, 538 P.2d 318, the Court identified several factors which tend to establish control.
Those factors were the extent and right of supervision, method of payment, provision of equipment,
right to terminate, and whether the individual has other clients. The Court made it clear that the
foregoing factors are not exhaustive, but merely illustrative.
More recently, in Averett v. Grange. 909 P.2d 246,249 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court
has emphasized the importance of the "control" test in determining whether an individual is an
employee for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act:
In workers' compensation cases, this court has consistently held that whether
an employer-employee relationship exists depends upon the employer's right to
control the employee. . . . "It is not the actual exercise of control that determines
whether an employer-employee relationship exists; it is the right to control that is
determinative." (citations omitted.)
Osman attempts to characterize Enrique as an independent subcontractor and Steven as
Enrique's employee. However, the evidence establishes that both Enrique and Steven were
employees of Osman. Enrique was not independently established as a roofing contractor, but was
instead what might be termed a "journeyman roofer", moving jfrom job to job with an assortment of
different employers. He maintained none of the trappings of an independent contractor, such as an
office, insurance, advertising, or even the contractor's license required of independent building
contractors by Utah law.
The fact that Osman did not put the work in question out for bid is also indicative that
Enrique was working as Osman's employee. Furthermore, Osman had unfettered control over all
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aspects of the project. He could discharge any of the workers at any time. Even individuals such
as Steven, serving as assistants to the experienced roofers, had to be authorized by Osman. Finally,
the fact that Steven was paid directly by Osman is also consistent with Steven's status as his
employee.
The Industrial Commission recognizes that Enrique and Steven provided their own tools.
That fact is not sufficient to establish an independent contractor status, particularly in light of the
custom in the roofing industry for both employees and independent contractors to provide their own
tools.
Under all the foregoing facts, the Industrial Commission concludes that both Enrique and
Steven were "in the service of Osman. Consequently, Osman was Steven's direct employee at the
time of his accident and is liable for workers' compensation benefits stemming from that accident.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission concludes that Osman Home Improvement was the direct
employer of Arnulfo Steven Sosa at the time of Mr. Sosa's work accident on July 22, 1995. Osman
Home Improvement and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Credit General Insurance, are
therefore liable for the entire amount of Mr. Sosa's workers' compensation benefits, as those benefits
have been identified in the prior decision of the ALJ. It is so ordered.

IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request
for reconsideration must be received by the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a
petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within
30 days of the date of this order.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion For Review in the matter of
Amulfo Steven Sosa, Case No.95-1041 was mailed first class postage prepaid this Vffiday of June,
1997, to the following:
ARNULFO STEVEN SOSA
3093 SOUTH 9050 WEST
MAGNA, UTAH 84044
THOMAS C. STURDY
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
77 WEST 200 SOUTH SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
K.DAWNATKIN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
311 SOUTH STATE STREET #380
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
ENRIQUE SOSA
1625 RICHLAND AVENUE #130
CERES, CALIFORNIA 95351
SHARON EBLEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
P O BOX 146612
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6612
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35-1-42

(b) intentional abuse of drugs in excess of prescribed therapeutic
amounts; or
(c) intoxication from alcohol with a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 13; C.L. 1917,
§ 3073; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-14; 1995, ch. 328, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection

(2) and made significant related and stylistic
changes in Subsection (1), including adding
subsection designations and deleting a provision regarding injur;/ due to intoxication.

35-1-42. Employers e n u m e r a t e d a n d defined — Regularly
employed — Statutory employers.
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the state
are considered employers under this title.
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this title prescribed in
Sections 35-1-60 and 35-2-102, the state is considered to be a single
employer and includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, or other instrumentality of the state.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, including each public
utility and each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more
workers or operatives in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written is
considered an employer under this title. As used in Subsection (2):
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the
trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year.
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the performance of any work for another who, while so engaged, is independent of
the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only
in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's design.
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrangement under Title
58, Chapter 59, Employee Leasing Company Licensing Act, is considered
the employer of leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation
benefits for them by complying with Subsection 35-l-46(l)(a) or (b) and
commission rules.
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite such a risk showing the leasing
company as the named insured and each client company as an additional
insured by means of individual endorsements.
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the commission as directed by rule.
(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered an employer under this
title if:
(i) the employer's employees are all members of the employer's
immediate family and the employer has a proprietary interest in the
farm where they work; or
(ii) the employer employed five or fewer persons other than immediate family members for 40 hours or more per week per employee for
13 consecutive weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months.
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee or more
than one employee at least 40 hours per week is not considered an
employer under this title.
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(5) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not
under this title has the right and option to come under it by complying with its
provisions and the rules of the commission.
(6) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done
wholly or in part for the employer by a contractor over whose work the
employer retains supervision or control, and this work is a part or process
in the trade or business of the employer, the contractor, all persons
employed by the contractor, all subcontractors under the contractor, and
all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are considered
employees of the original employer for the purposes of Chapters 1 and 2.
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, or
remodelling a residence that the person owns or is in the process of
acquiring as the person's personal residence may not be considered an
employee or employer solely by operation of Subsection (6)(a).
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may
not be considered an employee under Subsection (6)(a) if:
(i) the partnership or sole proprietorship secures the payment of
workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Section 35-1-46; and
(ii) the employer who procures work to be done by the partnership
or sole proprietorship obtains and relies on valid certification of the
partnership's or sole proprietorship's compliance with Section 35-1-46.
(d) A director or officer of a corporation may not be considered an
employee under Subsection (6)(a) if the director or officer is excluded from
coverage under Subsection 35-1-43(4).
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of the employer
under Subsection (6)(a), if the employer who procures work to be done by
the contractor or subcontractor obtains and relies on valid certification of
the contractor's or subcontractor's compliance with Section 35-1-46.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 50; C.L. 1917,
§ 3110; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-140; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-40; L.
1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 1; 1983, ch.
355, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 3; 1988, ch. 109, § 1;
1992, ch. 178, § 2; 1993, ch. 106, § 1; 1993,
ch. 140, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 77; 1995, ch. 307,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment by ch. 20, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "35-2-102" for "35-2-3" in Subsection
(l)(b).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 307, effective
May 1, 1995, deleted a reference to Section
35-2-3 in Subsection (l)(b); added "for the purposes of Chapters 1 and 2" in Subsection (6)(a);
deleted Subsections (6)(b) and (c), discussing

general contractors and subcontractors, and
redesignated Subsection (6)(d) as (b) and (6)(e)
as (c); rewrote Subsections (6)(c)(i) and (ii),
which formerly discussed employee status under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a); deleted Subsection (6)(f), establishing a presumption that
partners and sole proprietors "had or shared
control or responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of
direct compensation," and redesignated Subsection (6)(g) as (d), substituting "35-1-43(4)" for
"35-1-43(3)00"; added a new Subsection (6)(e);
and made numerous related and stylistic
changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Multiple employers.
Temporary employees.
Cited.
Multiple employers.
An employee, for the purpose of workers'
compensation, may have two employers, and
either employer may invoke the exclusive rem-

edy provision if an employer-employee relationship existed at the time of the injury to the
employee. Bliss v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 866 F.
Supp. 1362 (D. Utah 1994).
Temporary employees.
A temporary employment service is not like a
subcontractor since it does not perform any
work for its customers but merely supplies or
"loans" workers who are under contract to the
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service to work for its clients; the relationships
between the service, a "loaned" or temporary
employee, and the temporary employer are different from statutory employee-employer relationships, and different legal principles govern
these relationships. Ghersi v. Salazar, 883 R2d
1352 (Utah 1994).
A temporary employment service and the
company using a temporary employee assigned
by the service were protected by the exclusive
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act by application of the "loaned employee
doctrine," since a contract was implied between
the company and the employee, the work being
done was essentially that of the company and
the company had the right to control details of
the work and because, under the agreement
between the company and the service, a portion
of the fee paid by the company was used by the
service to carry workers' compensation insurance. Ghersi v. Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352 (Utah
1994).

35-1-43

A temporary employee on loan to a client
(special employer) of a temporary employment
service (general employer) becomes the employee of the special employer for the purpose of
the exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation if: the employee has made a contract
0 f hire, express or implied, with the special
employer; the work being done is essentially
t h a t 0 f t^e
s p e c i a l employer; and the special
emDlover has the right to control the details of
t h e w o r k > B l i s s v E m s t H o m e Ctr<? I n c ? 8 6 6

R

Supp 1362 (D Utah 1994)
C l i e n t s (special e m p l o y e r s ) of

temporary emservices (general emplovers) are not
i n c I u d e d i n t h e categories enumerated in § 351 . 6 2 ( 4 ) , delineating entities not occupying an
employer-employee relationship with an inj u r e d e m p l o y e e > mis3
v . E r a s t Home Ctr., Inc.,
8 6 6 R S u p p > 1 3 6 2 ( D . U t a h 1994).
ployment

C i t e d in Goheen v. Yellow Freight Sys., 32
F.3d 1450 (10th Cir. 1994).

35-1-43. "Employee," "worker" or "workmen," and "operative" defined — Mining lessees and sublessees —
Corporate officers a n d directors — Real estate
agents a n d b r o k e r s .
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workmen," and "operative" mean:
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any other person, in the
service of the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district within the
state, serving the state, or any county, city, town, or school district under
any election or appointment, or under any contract of hire, express or
implied, written or oral, including each officer and employee of the state
institutions of learning and members of the National Guard while on state
active duty; and
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section
35-1-42, who employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the
same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors,
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but not including any person
whose employment is casual and not in the usual course of the trade,
business, or occupation of his employer.
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter, any
lessee in mines or of mining property and each employee and sublessee of the
lessee shall be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter, and
shall be subject to this chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such wages as are paid
employees for substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct from the
proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance
premium for that type of work.
(3) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include any partner of
the partnership or owner of the sole proprietorship as an employee of the
partnership or sole proprietorship under this chapter. If a partnership or sole
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve written notice upon its
insurance carrier naming the persons to be covered. No partner of a partner-
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ship or owner of a sole proprietorship is considered an employee of their
partnership or sole proprietorship under this chapter until this notice has been
given. For premium rate making, the insurance carrier shall assume the
salary or wage of the partner or sole proprietor electing coverage to be 100% of
the state's average weekly wage.
(4) A corporation may elect not to include any director or officer of the
corporation as an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes this
election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the
persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is
considered an employee under this chapter until this notice has been given.
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real estate sales agent or real estate broker, as defined in
Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for a real estate broker
if:
(a) substantially all of the real estate sales agent's or associated
broker's income for services is from real estate commissions;
(b) the services of the real estate sales agent or associated broker are
performed under a written contract specifying that the real estate agent is
an independent contractor; and
(c) the contract states that the real estate sales agent or associated
broker is not to be treated as an employee for federal income tax purposes.
(6) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "operative" do not include an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or
64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or regulation.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 51; C.L. 1917,
§ 3111; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; 1925, ch. 73, § 1;
R.S. 1933, 42-1-41; L. 1939, c h . 51, § 1; C.
1943, 42-1-41; L. 1943, ch. 48, § 1; 1945, ch.
65, § 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1;
1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 2; 1984, ch.
76, § 1; 1985, ch. 75, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 4;
1988, c h . 109, § 2; 1993, ch. 106, § 2; 1993,
ch. 130, § 1; 1995, ch. 307, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, redesignated Sub-

section (3)(a) as (3), deleting a requirement to
serve notice on the commission, replacing
"150%" with "100%" and "employee" with "partner or sole proprietor electing coverage" in the
last sentence, and making stylistic changes;
redesignated Subsection (3)(b) as (4), deleting a
requirement to serve notice on the commission;
redesignated Subsection (4) as (5), adding
"sales" before "agent" throughout the subsection; and redesignated Subsection (5) as (6).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Multiple employers.
Temporary employees.
Multiple employers.
An employee, for the purpose of workers'
compensation, may have two employers, and
either employer may invoke the exclusive remedy provision if an employer-employee relationship existed at the time of the injury to the
employee. Bliss v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 866 F.
Supp. 1362 (D. Utah 1994).
Temporary e m p l o y e e s .
A temporary employee on loan to a client

(special employer) of a temporary employment
service (general employer) becomes the employee of the special employer for the purpose of
the exclusive remedy provision of workers'compensation if: the employee has made a contract
of hire, express or implied, with the special
employer; the work being done is essentially
t h a t of the special employer; and the special
employer has the right to control the details of
the work. Bliss v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 866 F.
Supp. 1362 (D. Utah 1994).
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Case No, 951041

ARNULFO STEVEN SOSA,
Applicant,
vs.
ENRIQUE SOSA (Uninsured) and
UNITED STAFFING/OSMAN HOME
IMPROVEMENTS/CREDIT GENERAL
INSURANCE and UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
November 25, 1996 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Said
hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was respresented by K. Dawn Atkin,
Attorney.
The
defendant,
Enrique
represented himself.

Sosa

(Uninsured) ,

The
defendants,
United
Staffing/Osman
Improvements/Credit
General
Insurance-,
represented by Thomas Sturdy, Attorney.

Home
were

The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented
Sharon Eblen, Attorney.

by

This case involves a claim for additional temporary total
compensation (TTC) related to a July 22, 1995 industrial accident
in which the applicant fell off a roof, causing severe injuries to
both his feet and ankles and to his lumbar spine. The insurance
carrier for Osman Home Improvements, Credit General Insurance, has
paid the applicant $2,356.71 in TTC, to date, however, the carrier
now argues that it is not liable for any further benefits to the
applicant, as Osman Home Improvements was neither the applicant's
common law employer, nor his statutory employer.
The carrier
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asserts that Enrique Sosa, the applicant's uncle, and an
independent contractor with Osman Home Improvements, was the
applicant's common law employer.
The Uninsured Employers Fund
argues that Osman Home Improvements was at least the applicant's
statutory employer, and thus it asserts that, if in fact Enrique
Sosa is unable to pay benefits to the applicant, any liability to
the applicant must be shared as between the Uninsured Employers
Fund and Credit General Insurance.
The applicant claims that the $2,356.71 in TTC he has been
paid by Credit General Insurance is insufficient as payment for his
period of medical instability, from July 23, 1995 through December
11, 1995. The applicant claims that he is entitled to TTC for that
period (20.286 weeks) based on a $320.00/week compensation rate,
the appropriate rate for an average weekly wage of $480.00/week
($10.00/hour x 48 hours/week). The applicant did not work a full
week before he was injured, but the applicant claims the
$480.00/week average weekly wage based on his understanding that he
would be paid a wage of $10.00/hour, working approximately 6 days
per week, 8 hours/day. The carrier asserts that, if it does have
any liability to the applicant, the applicant's average weekly wage
should be estimated to be $240.00/week, based on a wage of
$6.00/hour, 40 hours per week. The carrier asserts that this is
the most the applicant would actually get paid for assisting
Enrique Sosa in his roofing contract with Osman Home Improvements.
This case was heard on November 25, 1996, with the
applicant, Enrique Sosa and Michael Osman of Osman Home
Improvements offering testimony. The matter was considered ready
for order at the end of the hearing on that date.
EVIDENCE PRESENTED:
In July of 1995, DMC Builders, a general construction
contractor headquartered in Texas, was building apartment buildings
on the site in question in Sandy, Utah. DMC Builders contracted
with the defendant Osman Home Improvements to perform the roofing
and some waterproofing on the apartment buildings at the Sandy
site. Osman Home Improvements, apparently generally owned and run
by Michael Osman, had a subcontracting license with the state of
Utah to perform roofing work.
Per Enrique Sosa, Osman Home
Improvements ran an ad in the newspaper seeking roofers. Enrique
Sosa has been a roofer for 11 years and had worked for Osman Home
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Improvements on one prior occasion.
Enrique Sosa has no
subcontractor's license, Enrique Sosa called Michael Osman when he
saw the ad in the paper and Sosa states that Osman agreed to hire
him to do roofing on the Sandy apartment buildings, Enrique Sosa
stated that there was no bidding process and Osman simply told him
that he would be paid a piece-work rate of $14.00 per square.
Enrique Sosa agreed to do the work, however, Osman indicated to him
that the actual roofing work could not begin until the roofing
materials were delivered to the site. Apparently, the two agreed
that Enrique Sosa would drive by the site occasionally to see if
the materials had arrived and would begin work once he saw the
materials there.
Apparently, some time in early July, Enrique Sosa decided
to have his nephew, Arnulfo Sosa, the applicant in this matter,
assist him in the roofing work at the Sandy apartment buildings.
Enrique Sosa stated that, at some point also apparently in early
July, he took the applicant in to introduce him to Osman and to get
Osman's OK that the applicant assist him in is roofing work.
Enrique Sosa recalls that Osman was fairly busy and perhaps talking
with some other individuals in his office on the day that he took
the applicant in to introduce him. Enrique Sosa recalls that he
introduced the applicant to Osman quickly and told Osman that the
applicant would be working with him as an apprentice. Enrique Sosa
stated that Osman never said anything in response, but did give
Enrique Sosa the lfOK look," which Enrique Sosa took to mean that
Osman agreed to pay the applicant for roofing performed at the
Sandy site. Apparently, Enrique Sosa has worked union jobs in
other states in which there are set rules regarding how apprentices
are paid. Based on this past experience, Enrique Sosa understood
that, as the applicant's supervisor, he would be in charge of
keeping track of how much work the applicant peformed and he would
submit the applicant's piece-work accomplishments to Osman along
with his own, with Osman then paying each of them separately, based
on Enrique's Sosa's breakdown of what work each had accomplished.
Although Osman does not recall ever meeting the applicant, he did
indicate that he may have given Enrique Sosa permission to bring
the applicant on the job.
Although the applicant's testimony was not always clear,
because he spoke very softly and answered all questions with very
short answers, he stated that he actually worked at the site in
question just 3 days, July 20, 1995, July 21, 1995 and July 22,
1995, having his fall injury on the final day. The applicant's
testimony regarding his pay rate was very unclear. He appeared to
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indicate both that he would be paid $10.OO/square and $10.00/hour.
Enrique Sosa indicated that he told the applicant that he would
probably average a wage of $10.00/hour/ as this is what he felt the
applicant could make, based on the piece-work he would accomplish.
It is clear that the applicant, only 18 years old on the date of
injury, had no experience as a roofer and had worked previously
only as a janitor and a dishwasher, making at most $6.00/hour. The
applicant understood that Osman did not require that they work any
specific days of the week and Enrique Sosa indicated that he
understood that this was true, but that he was required to work at
least 4-5 days per week.
Osman testified that the roofing
subcontractors that worked for him were generally so unreliable,
with respect to showing up for work, that he had no expectations or
requirements for them regarding the number of days per week that
they needed to work.
The applicant testified that on the 3 days that he worked,
there were other roofers working on other buildings at the
apartment complex and Osman admitted that at least some of the
other roofers on the job were hired by him.
The applicant
testified that he brought a hammer, pouches and a rope with him to
work. Enrique Sosa supplied a compressor, hoses, ladders, a nail
gun/stapler and a skill saw. Osman apparently supplied only the
roofing supplies. Osman felt that he visited the jobsite only 1-3
times per week, but the applicant apparently recalls that Osman was
at the jobsite on the 3 consecutive days that he worked. Osman
indicated that he felt he could fire any of his roofing
subcontractors, could inform them to perform the roofing in a
different manner, if they were doing it incorrectly, and could tell
them that they were disallowed to employ helpers, if he wanted.
Osman stated that he did check to see if the roofers were, using a
harness and belt on the job, as this was an OSHA requirement. He
stated that the roofers generally provided this equipment for
themselves.
After his fall from the roof on July 22, 1995, the applicant
was admitted to Alta View Hospital for four days, during which he
underwent surgery specified as: open reduction and internal
fixation of bilateral os calcis fractures. It was noted that he
also had lumbar spine compression fractures. Thereafter, he was
followed by orthopedist, Dr. J. H o m e , and referred to physical
therapy. He was released for light duty work in early December
1995 and apparently did return to some work at that time.
The
medical records indicate that the applicant may require subtalar
fusion surgery in the future and that he has work/activity

; nsa

ORDER
RE: ARNULFO SOSA
PAGE 5

restrictions limiting him from climbing, or prolonged standing and
walking. Permanent impairment has been rated for both feet and the
lumbar spine, but the parties indicated at hearing that this is not
a contested issue which requires any ruling made by the ALJ.
Osman did pay the applicant $168.00 for work performed on
the 3 days in question. However, it is unclear if this was based
on any specific hourly rate and Osman indicated he paid it simply
because he felt sorry for the applicant and wanted to help him out
after his fall.
LEGAL ARGUMENT:
With respect to Credit General's liability, as the workers
compensation carrier for Osman Home Improvement, Credit General and
the Uninsured Employers Fund agree that the right to supervise and
control determines whether Osman Home Improvement is considered a
statutory employer of Enrique Sosa. However, Credit General argues
that case law is supportive of finding insufficient supervision and
control of Osman over Sosa and the Uninsured Employers Fund cites
case law that finds that the right to supervise and control need
only be very general in order to find statutory employment. Credit
General has cited Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation, 675 P.2d 1196,
(Utah 1984), a case involving a general building contractor and a
roofing subcontractor. The Uninsured Employers Fund has cited as
controlling, Pinter Const. Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984),
involving a general building contractor and a metal erection
subcontractor, and Bennett v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 72 6 P. 2d
427 (Utah 1986) , involving a general building contractor, a
subcontractor specializing in concrete work and an individual who
subcontracted or was employed by the concrete subcontractor.
With respect to the applicant's pay rate, Credit General
argues that one cannot presume that the applicant would have been
capable of doing piece-work sufficient to entitle him to a wage
rate equivalent to $10.00/hour, considering that he had no
experience in roofing. The carrier argues that it makes more sense
to presume that the applicant would have been paid as he had been
in his two previous jobs, at most $6.00/hour. The applicant argues
only that $10.00/hour is what the applicant understood he would be
paid and what his common law employer, Enrique Sosa, told him he
would earn.
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CONCLUSIONS:
The ALJ finds that Osman Home Improvement was Enrique Sosa's
statutory employer, with Enrique Sosa being the applicant's common
law employer.
These findings result in Osman Home Improvement
being the statutory employer of the applicant, per U.C.A. 35-142(6) (a) . The case law cited by the Uninsured Employers Fund (i.e.
the Pinter case and the Bennett case) are supportive of this
conclusion, because they find that the right to control that is
required in order to find statutory employment is only a very
general right to control, or as it is stated in Bennett, the most
recent case cited, just retention of the ultimate control over the
project. Certainly, Osman retained at least this much control. He
also might be interpreted to have more control than the employer
general contractor in the Graham case cited by Credit General.
Graham involved a general contractor who knew little about roofing,
making it rather difficult for the general contractor to assert any
real control over the roofer's work. The instant case involves a
roofing subcontractor (Osman) who hired roofers, like Enrique Sosa,
to work for him. Although Osman generally hired others to do the
work, he was a licensed roofing subcontractor who stated that he
did retain the right to tell his roofers to perform the work
differently, if he felt they were doing the work incorrectly.
Therefore, the ALJ finds that the instant set of facts can be
distinguished from those specified in Graham. The ALJ also finds
that the Bennett case is the more recent case law on the retention
to control issue, and the more generally cited as the controlling
authority with respect to right to control.
With respect to the wage rate issue, the ALJ finds this case
particularly obscure with respect to information that would allow
for assessment of a probable average weekly wage for the applicant.
The testimony regarding the pay rate discussed, and the general pay
rate for roofers working for Osman, was either vague or confusing.
The ALJ finds it inappropriate to just presume that the applicant
would be making what he made as a dishwasher or janitor. These
jobs are not similar to roofing at all and one cannot presume that
the pay rates should be similar. Since that rate of pay cannot be
presumed to be applicable, there is no other evidence as to what
the applicant probably was earning, but the rate that Enrique Sosa
indicated was applicable (i.e. $10.00/hour) . However, the ALJ
finds that it is incorrect to presume a 6-day week for the
applicant. Enrique Sosa indicated that he felt he only needed to
work 4-5 days, and he did not indicate that he generally worked
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anymore than required. In addition, Osman stated that it would be
unusual for any of his roofers to work even a 5-day work week. As
such, the ALJ presumes that a 5-day work week is probably more in
keeping with reality than the 6-day week suggested by the
applicant. The ALJ therefore finds that the applicant's projected
average weekly wage was $400.00/week (8 hours per day at $10.00 per
hour, 5 days per week).
This would make the applicable
compensation rate to be $267.00/week ($400.00/week x .667).
BENEFITS DUE:
As the ALJ understands it, the only disputed benefit
currently is the TTC award. Therefore, the ALJ will award only the
currently applicable TTC due. Based on the 20.286 weeks of medical
instability indicated earlier in this order, the applicant is due
$5,416.36 in TTC (20.286 weeks x $267.00/week) less the benefits
paid to date of $2,356.71, or a total of $3,059.65 currently due
and payable. The applicant's attorney is due 2 0% of the net amount
due, per R568-1-7, or $611.93.
The ALJ understands that the
parties will settle any further benefits that may be due the
applicant (i.e. permanent impairment benefits).
DEFENDANTS LIABLE:
Based on the conclusion that Osman Home Improvement is the
statutory employer in this matter, Enrique Sosa, the common law
employer, and Osman Home Improvement, the statutory employer, are
jointly liable to pay the benefits due the applicant. Enrique Sosa
indicated at hearing that he was unemployed and living in
California at that time. Based on that information, and having no
other information, the ALJ finds that, for all practical purposes,
he is unable to pay the benefits due the applicant. As such, the
ALJ finds that the Uninsured Employers Fund (UEF) must contribute
to the payment of the applicants benefits, per BB & B Transp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 2 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) . The
ALJ will presume that UEF and Credit General will settle with each
other regarding the proportionate share of the benefits each will
pay. The ALJ finds that Credit General should pay the benefits to
the applicant initially and shall seek reimbursement from UEF for
its proportionate share.

It 323

ORDER
RE: ARNULFO SOSA
PAGE 8

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, United
Staffing/Osman Home Improvement/Credit General Insurance, pay the
applicant, Arnulfo Sosa, temporary total compensation, at the rate
of $2 67.00/week per week, for 2 0.28 6 weeks, or a total of
$5,416.36, for the period of medical instability associated with
the July 22, 1995 industrial injury, from July 23, 1995 to December
11, 1995. That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump
sum, less the benefits paid to date of $2,356.71, plus interest at
8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to be
awarded below.
IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
that
the
defendants,
United
Staffing/Osman Home Improvement/Credit General Insurance, pay K.
Dawn Atkin, attorney for the applicant, the sum of $611.93, plus
20% of the interest payable on the award, per R568-1-7, for
services rendered in this matter, the same to be deducted from the
aforesaid award to the applicant, and to be remitted directly to
the office of K. Dawn Atkin.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund shall
reimburse
the
defendants,
United
Staffing/Osman
Home
Improvement/Credit General Insurance, for its proportionate share
of the benefits payable to the applicant, after those benefits have
been paid to the applicant by the defendants, United Staffing/Osman
Home Improvement/Credit General Insurance.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund is
entitled to full remimbursement, for any benefits paid on this
claim, from the uninsured common law employer, Enrique Sosa.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within
thirty (3 0) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion
for Review is received by the Commission within thirty (3 0) days of
the date hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion
for Review by the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 6346b-12.

DATED this 30th day of January, 1997.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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